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In an historical overview, this paper links to the
paradox that the increasing scientification of
politics leads to a politicisation of science. For a
long time, scientists offered their capabilities as
‘speaking truth to power’. Since the beginning
of the 1990s, this input has been transformed
into an argumentative policy analysis. This
reinvigorates political prudence as ‘making
sense together’.
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A
CCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy
science is about the production and applica-
tion of knowledge of and in policy. Pol-
icy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the
political agenda successfully, should be able to mobi-
lise the best available knowledge. This requires
high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers
and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how
policy processes really evolve. This demands precise
knowledge of policy.
There is an obvious link between the two: the more
and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to
mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses
this interdependence by defining the policy
scientist’s operational task as eliciting the maximum
rational judgement of all those involved in policy-
making.
For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst
this implies the development of two skills. First, for
the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge
in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between
different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise
the interdependence between science in and of policy,
she/he should be able to mediate between science and
politics. Hence Dunn’s (1994, page 84) formal defini-
tion of policy analysis as an applied social science
discipline that uses multiple research methods in a
context of argumentation, public debate [and political
struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communi-
cate policy-relevant knowledge.
Historically, the differentiation and successful
institutionalisation of policy science can be inter-
preted as the spread of the functions of knowledge
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organisation, storage, dissemination and application
in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988;
van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover,
this scientification of hitherto ‘unscientised’ func-
tions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed
to gear them to the political system. In that sense,
Lerner and Lasswell’s (1951) call for policy sciences
anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the
scientification of politics.
Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the
science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the
scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation
of science. Numerous studies of political controver-
sies indeed show that science advisors behave like
any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet
science somehow managed to maintain its functional
cognitive authority in politics. This may be because
of its changing shape, which has been characterised as
the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-na-
tional network democracy (Andersen and Burns,
1996, pages 227–251).
National political developments are put in the
background by ideas about uncontrollable, but appar-
ently inevitable, international developments; in Eu-
rope, national state authority and power in public
policy-making is leaking away to a new political
and administrative élite, situated in the institutional
ensemble of the European Union. National represen-
tation is in the hands of political parties which no lon-
ger control ideological debate. The authority and
policy-making power of national governments is also
leaking away towards increasingly powerful pol-
icy-issue networks, dominated by functional repre-
sentation by interest groups and practical experts.
In this situation, public debate has become even
more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the
predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and
administrative argument, and under-articulated as a
result of an explosion of new political schemata that
crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new
schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part
they consist of a random and unarticulated
‘mish-mash’ of attitudes and images derived from
ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social
movement and personal political experiences.
The market-place of political ideas and arguments
is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citi-
zens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.
Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest
groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor
even the public media show any inclination, let alone
competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such
conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed
minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts,
arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in
rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific ‘vali-
dation’ does provide politicians, public officials and
citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideo-
logical universe in disarray.
For policy analysis to have any political impact un-
der such conditions, it should be able somehow to
continue ‘speaking truth’ to political élites who are
ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the
élites of administrators, managers, professionals and
experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisa-
tions populating the functional policy domains of
post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audi-
ence of an ideologically disoriented and politically
disenchanted citizenry.
Yet what does it mean to ‘speak truth to power’ in
contemporary society and politics? To answer this
question, first, I turn to some megatrends in
epistemological debate. On that basis, second, I will
delineate its implications for the development of pol-
icy analysis.
Epistemology
Once upon a time, social, political and administrative
élites genuinely believed in scientific rationality as a
key to solving collective problems. Like scientists
themselves, they were inheritors of the ‘Enlighten-
ment’, who pictured unfettered growth of scientific
knowledge as the driving force of social progress and
individual ‘pursuit of happiness’.
However, after two World Wars, the Shoah
(Nazi death camps) and the Gulag (Soviet death
camps), the nuclear race, the ecological crisis, and
the fall of ‘scientific’ communism, belief in
scientific rationality is decaying. Science and
scientists are, to a greater or lesser extent, accessories
to human suffering and ecological degradation. For
religious fundamentalists and modern neo-tribalists
this suffices to reject science in a ‘rage against
reason’.
Even post-modernists reject claims to ground
political and social ideas in scientific, rational and
consistent argument as potentially exclusive, sup-
pressive, technocratic and ultimately undemocratic.
Instead, they celebrate ‘otherness’, incompatibilities
and ruptures between lifestyles, cultures, discourses,
pluralism, the decentred ego, and the uniqueness,
contingency and fragmentation of all social
phenomena.
Richard Bernstein (1991) has characterised
this new intellectual force-field aptly as the polarity
of a “both/and” situation: the modernist idea of
the Enlightenment as ‘unfinished project’ and the
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post-modernist idea of it as ‘historical error’ are like
opposites that can never be reconciled, yet are inextri-
cably intertwined in that they mutually elicit and illu-
minate each other. Therefore, it is unnecessary to
push matters to an extreme. I would rather cast the
modernism–post-modernism divide as different ac-
cents within a markedly revised concept of scientific
rationality.
First, the conviction that empirical–analytic scien-
tific procedure alone may lay claim to scientific
rationality has become untenable. In this (neo-)posi-
tivist conception, science is based on strictly neutral,
objective, carefully controlled sense observation of
physical and social facts. Long observation is sup-
posed to uncover regularities and patterns, which,
crafted into abstract hypotheses, are amenable to fur-
ther rigorous testing. Hypotheses surviving these fur-
ther tests, may be used in the formulation of deductive
systems of lawlike propositions, in which they enter
as the general premises in the covering-law model of
explanation and prediction.
Habermas (1971) has shown that this idea
corres-ponds to just one knowledge interest constitu-
tive of science, that is, the domain of labour, work and
human control over a physical or social environment.
Yet humans know more action domains, and there-
fore knowledge interests. Interaction and mutual un-
derstanding of action motives and meanings is a
second knowledge interest. It lends the interpretative
and hermeneutic sciences their legitimate claim to
scientific rationality.
Where meaningful interactions are suffocated by
unconscious collective images or pre-understandings
which deserve articulation, reflection and critique,
there is a legitimate task for critical science. Empiri-
cal analysis of data, skilful interpretation of socially
constructed meanings and social critique are equally
important, vital elements of an enlarged concept of
scientific rationality.
Second, it is now nearly universally acknowledged
by scientists that scientific knowledge is fallible. The
Cartesian ‘either/or’ position has been abandoned.
Those who like to be considered ‘scientifically ratio-
nal’ can no longer appeal to rocklike cognitive cer-
tainties or axioms (be they God, the Cogito, or sense
observation). Modern rationality rests on acknowl-
edging that “there is no belief or thesis — no matter
how fundamental — that is not open to further
interpretation and criticism” (Bernstein, 1991, page
327).
Fallibility implies the expectation of being proven
wrong, and therefore the willingness to revise one’s
insights. Rationality as openness to learning further
presupposes the embeddedness of the scientist in a
durable social context of dialogue and action. An ac-
tion context, because only there the pragmatic alter-
nation between thought and action exists which
brings error to light. A context of critical dialogue, be-
cause this catalyses the learning process. It is not acci-
dental, then, that Habermas, defender par excellence
of the idea of the Enlightenment, has strongly argued
that cognitive–analytic rationality is unthinkable
without a rationality which, thus, needs to be social,
interactive and dialogic. Yet what use is this to policy
science and policy analysis?
Policy analysis
Democratic aspirations in early policy science
Policy science is usually traced back to Harold
Lasswell’s intellectual underpinning of the
endeavour to gear the applied social sciences system-
atically and methodically to the needs of strategic
public policy-making (Lasswell, 1951; 1971). In
Lasswell’s designs the relationship between policy
science and the practice of politics was to be demo-
cratic and pragmatic. Policy science was not a techno-
cratic strategy to substitute politics with enlightened
administration; nor was it a social technology, always
at the service of politicians and administrators.
For Lasswell, policy science was a vital element in
a political strategy to maintain democracy and human
dignity post-World War II. He follows in the foot-
steps of the pragmatists. In their view, politics is mod-
elled after peer review in science: it is a dialogue
between expert opinion and the opinions of a larger
public, in a community united by the quest for an-
swers to shared problems.
Politics is seen as probing and honest debate, and
not as conflict management which succeeds by ex-
ploiting the ignorance and incomplete knowledge of
citizens. In a sense, political and policy science’s goal
is not to replace ‘ordinary’ political prudence and
common sense with cognitively superior scientific
knowledge, but to reinvigorate and systematise them
(van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, pages 61–63;
Torgerson, 1995, pages 234, 238–239).
Aspirations and rationality
Reality usually disappoints high aspirations, but it is
ironic that policy science’s breakthrough was inti-
mately connected to a half-hearted post-behavioural
turn in political science. Political scientists’ call to re-
capture relevance in the face of exaggerated method-
ological rigour, was translated into curriculum and
research programme innovations focusing on the
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The conviction that empirical-analytic
scientific procedure alone may lay
claim to scientific rationality has
become untenable; and it is now
nearly universally acknowledged by
scientists that scientific knowledge is
fallible
study of the content, processes and impacts of public
policy.
However, its purpose remained technocratic, re-
placing politicians’ and citizens’ ‘ordinary and local
knowledge’ of policy-making with a new, scientifi-
cally validated type of applied, general knowledge.
Better knowledge of causation, and know-how about
the application of scientific logic in decision-making
were the dominant claims on which the schools of
public policy were erected in one after another Amer-
ican university, and later in many European countries.
Testimony to the dialectics between the
scientification of politics and the politicisation of sci-
ence, the successful institutionalisation of policy sci-
ence in American academia was also a result of
favourable labour market prospects fuelled by a rising
demand for policy analysis in the Kennedy and John-
son administrations. In Europe, similar influences
were at work, especially in countries with so-
cial-democratic governments.
From an epistemological point of view, when
policy analysis was beginning, three cross-cutting
and non-exclusive currents can be discerned: analy-
centrism; neo-positivism; and critical rationalism
(Dryzek, 1993, pages 217–222).
Analycentric policy analysis claims cognitive superi-
ority over practice on the basis of the scientific logic
and consistency built into analytical techniques such
as cost-effectiveness analysis, cost–benefit analysis,
statistical decision theory, and planning–
programming–budgeting. The analycentric policy
analyst relies on algorithms, filled with data and
insights from secondary sources, either scientific or
practical. His/her ‘value-added’ is merely to see to it
that actual decision-making follows rigorous scien-
tific canons of procedural rationality (Behn and
Vaupel, 1982). Analycentric policy analysis has been
effectively criticised for its lack of political realism,
and, in spite of its alleged procedural neutrality, its in-
troduction of politically biased assumptions in the
guise of ‘technicalities’.
Neo-positivist policy analysis grounds its claim to
cognitive superiority in its knowledge of causal links.
The attractiveness of a neo-positivist concept of
science is that knowledge of scientific laws, in techni-
cal–instrumental fashion, may be applied to the ex-
planation of the emergence of policy problems and
the prediction of impacts of certain policy interven-
tions. After all, if a policy is a plan for achieving par-
ticular objectives with the help of certain means,
certified causal knowledge is indispensable. For
objectives are consequences preferred by pol-
icy-makers; and means are their chosen and manipu-
lated causes.
Although the grounding of policy analysis in
causal knowledge lingers on, neo-positivist policy
analysis has withered away. The above-mentioned
criticism by Habermas certainly played a role here,
but, applied to policy analysis, neo-positivism leads
to obvious self contradictions. If human behaviour
generally is driven by laws governing the behaviour
of ordinary people, why grant immunity from such
laws to politicians and policy-makers (Bobrow and
Dryzek, 1987, page 132)? Also, neo-positivists over-
look that causal knowledge, through humanity’s ca-
pacity for learning, may ‘self destruct’ the causal laws
on which a policy is based.
Critical–rationalist policy analysis shares with
neo-positivism its claim to superior causal knowl-
edge. However, it strongly differs in how to acquire it
in the real world. In this respect, critical–rational pol-
icy analysis means an enormous step towards a
fallibilist and learning concept of rationality.
Building on Popper’s (1974) “falsificationism” and
his political philosophy of piecemeal social engineer-
ing, Campbell and Stanley (1963) have developed
critical–rational policy analysis into a sophisticated
methodology of quasi-experimental impact evalua-
tion. In their view, knowledge acquisition and prog-
ress is an evolutionary process of learning from trial
and error in successive efforts to compare hypotheses
to experimentally generated impacts. This is true for
both ordinary and scientific knowledge. Science is
the more efficient learning strategy because of the
stricter requirements for the conditions of learning
and the interpretation of results.
Applied to policy-making, a policy’s content is
seen as hypothesis, and implementation is a social ex-
periment. Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) have ob-
served such processes of serial policy adjustment in
practice. However, unlike routine practice, in criti-
cal–rational policy analysis the controlled nature of
the experiment is of prime importance. This means
that policy analysts are responsible for keeping objec-
tives and conditions for implementation stable during
the process.
Afterwards, the impact of an intervention on the
properties of an experimental group may be com-
pared to that of a similarly composed control group.
Any differences found may then be attributed to the
policy intervention. Repeated experiments will lead
gradually to better knowledge as a result of error
elimination. Ideally, true to the ideals of an open soci-
ety, not just the experimenting and evaluating policy
analysts, but also those subjected to the experiment
can offer their views and criticisms.
Critical–rational policy analysis has many
strengths. By conceiving policy as hypothesis and im-
plementation as experiment, it escapes from the
neo-positivist illusion that delay of action may
improve knowledge. The analogy between pol-
icy-making and experimenting better fits a political real-
ity of permanent time pressure and action imperatives.
In addition, the doctrine of an open and experi-
menting society returns to pragmatist notions of the
polity as a community of problem-solvers. In princi-
ple, therefore, critical–rational policy analysis
escapes the technocratic tendencies inherent in
analycentric and neo-positivist approaches.
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Nevertheless, there are several catches. Some of
the criticism focuses on the incremental or piecemeal
nature of policy experiments and the slow progress of
knowledge in implementing the critical–rational
programme. It is argued that this does not fit a world
of rapid change in which some policy experiments de-
pend for their success on non-incremental increases
in resources, and on enthusiasm rather than critique.
Another type of criticism addresses the gap be-
tween the doctrine of the open, experimenting society
and the practice of quasi-experimental impact evalua-
tion. Stringent top-down implementation in different
sites is a prerequisite for controlled social experi-
ments. In practice, this leads to a ‘cosy relationship’
among reform-minded politicians, administrators
and the scientific policy evaluators, who jointly treat
citizens like objects not entitled to any criticism dur-
ing or after the experiment (Dryzek, 1993, page 220).
The most lethal criticism, however, concerns the
analogy to scientific experiment underlying Popper’s
and Campbell and Stanley’s views. In particular,
Dunn (1993) has shown convincingly that the anal-
ogy runs into crippling objections if applied to social
systems and policy problems. Even if reform-minded
policy-makers and evaluators go to great lengths to
arrange the experiments in such a way that results
counter to their expectations and preferences may oc-
cur, the social dynamics of human symbol
internalisation and externalisation (Berger and
Luckman, 1967) or structuration (Giddens, 1979) im-
ply that:
“… experimental [design and] outcomes are
unavoidably mediated by diverse standards of
appraisal which are unevenly distributed among
stakeholders in policy reforms. … Social theo-
ries, unlike physical ones, are difficult to falsify
with experimental data because the interpreta-
tion of such data is mediated by the assump-
tions, frames of reference, and ideologies of
social scientists and other stakeholders in re-
form” (Dunn, 1993, pages 259–260).
This poses no insurmountable problems in cases
of well-structured, rather static, and nearly decom-
posable policy issues, but such issues decrease in fre-
quency and urgency in contemporary politics.
Therefore, it may be concluded, as a fallibilist and er-
ror-eliminating method, critical–rationalism is only
fit for avoiding first-order errors concerning the se-
lection of the better of two or more causal hypotheses.
It is of little significance and help in avoiding sec-
ond-order errors of picking the more adequate of two
or more problem frames.
Although some critical–rationalists have em-
braced methodological multiplism as a remedy, on
balance, critical–rationalism relies on “qualitative,
common-sense knowing of wholes and patterns…”
(Campbell, 1982, pages 330–331) when it comes to
selection of problem definition and theoretical
frames. Campbell has conceded that, when the results
of a policy experiment frequently remain open to con-
flicting and ambiguous interpretation, “an experi-
ment is of itself no more than an argument”
(Campbell, 1982, pages 330–331). Therefore, I con-
clude that critical–rational policy analysis is on the
verge of an argumentative turn (see below).
Post-positivist turn in policy analysis
Somewhere around 1980, policy science’s original
wave of success subsided. Lindblom and Cohen’s Us-
able Knowledge (1979) marks a period where policy
scientists and analysts publicly doubt the
‘value-added’ for ‘ordinary knowledge’ of their
’professional social inquiry’. From the disappoint-
ments with analycentric, neo-positivist and criti-
cal–rational policy analysis, Carol Weiss (1991, page
321) draws the conclusion that the field is in intellec-
tual crisis:
“That social scientists shape the world they
study by the way they define the problem has
come to be accepted not only by social scientists
but by sophisticated political actors as well.
They are aware that researchers’ assumptions,
theories, and choice of variables can have large
effects on the answer they find. This new under-
standing throws into doubt the accommodation
[with political and administrative practice] that
earlier generations of social scientists had nego-
tiated. If they no longer claim to find ‘truth’
about ‘reality’, what is their role in the policy
process? The time seems to have arrived for a
new set of assumptions and arrangements.”
The new assumptions, not the new arrangements,
have arrived in the shape of the post-positivist turn.
This means that even policy analysts (in the social sci-
ences a rearguard in leaving the positivist and pure
critical–rationalist trenches) admit interpretative,
hermeneutic and critical approaches to their stock of
knowledge and methods. Within the post-positivist
turn broadly perceived, four main currents may by
discerned: relativistic; critical; forensic; and partici-
patory policy analysis.
A relativistic policy analysis can be attributed to the
‘early’ Lindblom and Wildavsky. Lindblom’a
empirically grounded insights in the disjointed
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incrementalist practice of policy-making
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) have always held
Lindblom back from any enchantment with the idea
of the attainment in practice of a more comprehensive
rationality intimated by a Lasswellian policy science.
As a ‘science of muddling through’, the most policy
analysis could hope for was to provide policy practice
with clever strategic shortcuts and simplifications.
Yet, to escape from the dangers of over-simplifica-
tion, one had to trust the practice of pluralist politics,
its partisan mutual adjustment, and its trial-and-error
learning in the successive limited comparisons of serial
adjustments.
Lindblom’s theory harbours strong fallibilist and
pragmatist convictions. In Usable Knowledge
(Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) he holds on to these vi-
tal insights. The impact of professional policy analy-
sis is limited, and adds only modest increments to the
ordinary knowledge of politicians and public offi-
cials. Policy analysts are condemned to provide argu-
mentative ammunition for the rhetorical struggles of
politicians (policy analysis as argument or data); only
occasionally they discover a nugget of enlightenment
(policy analysis as idea).
Wildavsky’s views do not differ much from
Lindblom’s, but they are more optimistic about the
“art and craft of policy analysis” (Wildavsky, 1979).
After all, Wildavsky is the founding father of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley’s policy analytic
curriculum. Policy analysis Wildavskian style is de-
picted as a dialogic and prudential balancing act in
which the policy analyst helps both politicians and
citizens to find a practical middle ground between the
ever- present tensions of resources and constraints,
cogitation and interaction, and dogma and scepsis.
Like Lindblom (1977) in his widely acclaimed
Politics and Markets, Wildavsky, at the beginning of
the 80s, lost his trust in political pluralism as an er-
ror-correcting safety net for biased, incremental poli-
cies (Wildavsky, 1988, pages xv–xxi). Concerned
about increasing ideological cleavages among the
American political élite and their impotence to forge a
new national consensus, he turned to group-grid cul-
tural theory to grasp better their diverging political
frames (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
Until 1980, Lindblom and Wildavsky defended an
interpretative–hermeneutic approach to policy analy-
sis, in the sense that they, like anthropologists among
the tribes of policy experts, have inquired into the pol-
icy practitioners’ rules for problem definition, policy
design, formulation and adoption, implementation,
and evaluation. This method accounts for the wide-
spread acceptance of their empirical findings.
Normatively speaking, however, their approach
often meant unquestioned compliance with the rules
of thumb and the supposed checks and balances of
pluralist political practice. This is comparable to a
hermeneutic approach to shared traditions and
pre-understandings without any thought of the possi-
bility of ideological, psychopathological or any other
reprehensible bias or prejudice (Torgerson, 1995; but
see Lindblom, 1990; Lindblom and Woodhouse,
1993). Many have pointed out that such an uncritical
interpretivist–hermeneutic approach to policy analy-
sis can lead to a scientifically or morally objection-
able relativism.
A critical-theoretical approach, advocated by For-
ester (1989), Dryzek (1990, and Bobrow and Dryzek
(1987)) has attacked the relativist approach to
policy analysis most. Their main accusation is that
relativists disregard the conditions for consensus
formation.
Forester blames Wildavsky for failing to differen-
tiate between political interaction (as a problem-
solving strategy in its own right, in addition to
cogitation or analysis) which does and does not elicit
true learning among citizens (Forester, 1985, page
265 ff). Forester deems this distinction essential in a
political system where common sense and shared
meaning can no longer be presupposed, and groups
with clashing political frames of reference have an in-
terest in maintaining public deception and bias.
Habermas’ communicative ethics (Habermas,
1981), especially his thoughts on the ideal speech sit-
uation in which people communicate free from power
relations, deception and self-deception, is used as a
standard for judging to what extent policy-makers
form a rational and genuine consensus. Policy ana-
lysts would have as their main task to monitor and
foster means of authentic consensus formation.
To this end, Fox and Miller (1995, pages 118–120)
have proposed criteria for legitimate contributions to
public debate: sincerity; situation-regarding
intentionality; willing attention; and unique and
indis-pensable expertise. These criteria demonstrate
that the critical policy analyst does not pursue public
participation for its own sake. He/she advocates
discursive pluralism with an eye to the quality of deci-
sion-making and the authenticity of consensus forma-
tion.
None the less, Fox and Miller admit that, in the vir-
tual reality and image struggles of the media, it is dif-
ficult to judge to what extent political debate observes
these four criteria. Forester (1989) has developed a
typology of biased and distorted policy communica-
tion, and corresponding counter- strategies for restor-
ing trust and authenticity. The implication is that
policy analysts themselves ought to see to it that their
own communicative and argumentative practices are
in order. The art of listening, respectful treatment of
target groups, avoidance of unnecessary ‘officialese’
and other expert discourse, and the craft of initiating
and conducting mutually enlightening debate — such
are the professional skills of the critical-cum-inter-
pretative policy analyst.
Critical analysis is often criticised on two counts.
Both regard the dangerous consequences of giving too
much weight to the guiding ideal of the ideal speech
situation. The first objection is that, however attrac-
tive from a theoretical perspective, these ideals are of
limited validity in practice. Where is the borderline
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between deception and misunderstanding? Who is to
determine what is the ‘better’ argument? To what
lengths should we go in debate and communication,
where we also know that human rationality is
bounded and fragile, and, sooner or later, we have to
act?
In other words, in all collective decision-making
we reach dead ends, or situations where a decision
cannot be made, where debate, reasoning, and the
force of the better argument are exhausted, and we
have to shift to some form of collective will formation
and legitimate power to bring the process to closure
(Hoppe, 1983, pages 231–235; Bernstein, 1991,
pages 221–222). All political systems are in need of
procedures for managing conflicts unresolvable by
debate and reasoned argument. The critical approach
to policy analysis turns a blind eye to this problem.
A second objection is that critical analysis often
gets stuck in a form of counter-expertise disinclined
to serious mutual reflection and learning. In such
cases, the critical policy analyst just provides rhetori-
cal ammunition for political fights, and merely con-
tributes to polarisation, zigzag policies and stalemate
(Schön, 1983, pages 349–350). Torgerson (1995,
page 245) holds that:
“critique turns against both the domain of com-
mon understandings and the restricted nature of
technocratic reason. … By… setting itself in
judgement of common understandings, critique
has an ironic potential to manifest itself as a mir-
ror-image of technocracy.”
In addition, a critical policy analyst, although a parti-
san of ‘the people’, easily overlooks or downplays di-
vergent opinions among ordinary citizens.
For the forensic policy analyst this danger is non- ex-
istent (Dunn, 1993; Paris and Reynolds, 1983;
Fischer, 1980; 1995; Schön, 1983; Schön and Rein,
1994). To him/her it is self evident that, as in post-
empiricist epistemology after Kuhn (1970) or the
conditions for post-normal science specified by
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993), policy practice is
flooded by different thinking styles, diverging inter-
pretative frames, competing policy belief systems,
various ideologies, alternative professional para-
digms, different world views, contrasting images of
man and nature, multiple perspectives, and so on.
Such frames are clusters of interlocking causal and nor-
mative beliefs, whose functions are at once cognitive,
communicative, and expressive of one’s identity.
To infuse a polyvalent world with meaning, sense
and purpose, and to make action and judgement pos-
sible at all, people need such frames as a sort of men-
tal grappling hook. For instance, professional frames
have been labelled the languages and cultures of
“tribes of experts” (Dryzek, 1993, page 222) which
create “contradictory certainties” (Schwarz and
Thompson, 1990). What people ‘see’, deem ‘rele-
vant’, and judge ‘persuasive evidence’ on the basis of
such frames, may indeed render them almost beyond
comparison or translation.
The forensic policy analyst considers that the task
is to use the differences between frames to forge an
innovative policy design from a combination of plau-
sible and robust arguments (‘frame-reflective
analysis’), or to test and bolster some frames
(‘frame-critical analysis’). Ideally, following rules of
hermeneutic policy evaluation for arriving at shared
constructions with policy stakeholders (Guba and
Lincoln, 1989), and acting on the precepts of reflec-
tive practitionership (Schön, 1983), analysts marry
frame-reflection and frame-criticism in an optimal
mix of hermeneutic and critical moments in policy
analysis.
Forensic analysts do not impose unreflectively a
particular professional or political frame on a prob-
lematic situation. Rather they consider the problem as
unstructured to begin with. Structuring problems in a
simultaneous process of reflection, action and politi-
cal strife, is the challenge of good analysis
(Hisschemöller and Hoppe, 1996). Schön (1983) and
Schön and Rein (1994) depict the forensic approach
to analysis as a continuous process of bricolage be-
tween the policy analyst/designer, the policy design,
and its wider environment, in which the policy design
ought eventually to function independently of the an-
alyst/designer.
The process of analysis and design cannot be
straightforward. Rather, the idea is to sustain creativ-
ity in one’s response to empirical uncertainties and
normative ambiguities in an ever-changing world.
Neither goals nor means are fixed; they are con-
structed transactionally over and over again in intelli-
gent deliberation and political argument, in a process
of “naming and framing” (Schön, 1983) which may
repeatedly unsettle and attack apparently dominant
concepts and frames of meaning.
It is obvious that the forensic approach, especially
one that successfully combines frame-analysis,
frame-reflection, and frame-criticism, fully corres-
ponds to the enlarged concept of rationality as
learning. Yet the approach faces serious hazards.
First, although some authors go to considerable
lengths to describe and prescribe rules of thumb, ade-
quate skills, and examples of best practice (Schön,
1983; Schön and Rein, 1994; Hoppe and Grin, 1995;
Grin et al, 1997), the forensic approach remains
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To the forensic policy analyst it is self
evident that policy practice is flooded
by different thinking styles, diverging
interpretative frames, competing
policy belief systems, various
ideologies, alternative professional
paradigms…
under-codified. This means that replication and error
detection and elimination are weak. Partially, this is
because of the nature of hermeneutics and critical the-
ory, which share scepticism, and sometimes down-
right rejection, of codifying rules and formulating
anything beyond the most general precepts of an ap-
proach to analysis.
Second, the forensic approach, more than any
other, is caught in a tension between the demands of
good analysis and the daily practice of politics and
public administration. The critical-rationalist and the
relativist policy analyst uncritically adjust to com-
mon practice in the role of trusted adviser of the polit-
ico–administrative élite; and even the critical analyst
easily slips into the role of a counter-expert. It is far
more difficult to carve out an acceptable niche for a
forensic analyst as ‘counsellor’ or ‘participatory ex-
pert’. Much more thought ought to be given to the in-
stitutional aspects of forensic policy analysis (see
George, 1980).1
Participatory policy analysis current in post-
positivist analysis should also be distinguished. The-
oretically, this current is heterogeneous, in that
participatory analysts appeal to relativist, critical,
and forensic concepts and themes. What unites their
paradigm, is a principled selection of a range of par-
ticipatory analytic techniques, in which citizens as
citizens play important roles (Mayer, 1997).
Primarily those inspired by critical theory insist on
the intrinsic merit of direct citizen participation in po-
litical decision-making. They justify participatory
analysis by claiming that it contributes vitally to par-
ticipatory democracy as the only rational form of life
for policy scientists and true democrats (Torgerson,
1986; Dryzek, 1990). These analysts systematically
favour participatory techniques in which a panel of
citizens is at the heart of the analytic process, like
methods for conducting consensus conferences or
planning cells. The policy analyst’s role is to serve
and bolster citizens’ policy recommendations (Hoppe
and Grin, 1995, pages 101–102).
Relativist, critical and forensic analysts value par-
ticipatory analysis for instrumental and contextual
reasons. They specify three situations in which the
use of participatory techniques is indispensable
 when a policy problem addresses citizens’ actions
up-front, and finding an acceptable solution de-
pends on appealing to and mobilising citizens’
knowledge of local or regional conditions;
 when policy issues have a strong ethical compo-
nent (when experts have no privileged knowledge
to bring to bear on the problem), or directly pertain
to citizens’ needs and wants;
 when experts are strongly divided over an issue.
Those who view participatory analysis more as an in-
strument than a goal per se will prefer participatory
techniques which produce structured debate between
citizens, politicians, officials, interest group
representatives and experts, such as scenario work-
shops and propositions debates. Here the analyst re-
mains in control of the analytical process; citizens’
participation, in certain situations and under particu-
lar conditions, vitally contributes to the information
base, and to validity or representativeness of the
analyst’s interpretation of public debate and his/her
recommendations.
The advantages of participatory analysis are obvi-
ous. In the three conditions mentioned, citizens’ input
to analysis is equally important, or even more im-
portant than the experts’. Methods of participatory
analysis are excellent means of harnessing citizens’
ordinary knowledge to analytical purposes. Participa-
tory methods are hardly disputed as an expansion of
the tool kits of relativist, critical and forensic policy
analysis. The most important criticism is that it is not
certain that citizen participation actually improves
and enriches the quality of policy debate. Formal
evaluations document that citizens rate the quality of
participatory debates systematically higher than pol-
icy-makers and experts (Mayer, 1997, pages
138–140). In the absence of objective measurement
and evaluation grounded in argumentation theory, it
is difficult to judge to what extent such ratings are
based on self-interested prejudice by policy-makers
and experts.
More fundamental criticism remains focused on
the aspirations for participatory democracy. In spite
of the impressive possibilities of interactive use of
contemporary information and communications
technology, the practical objections to participatory
dem-ocracy are likely to stay. The results of participa-
tory analytical exercises, even when the size of citi-
zen panels runs to hundreds or thousands (as in some
recent applications), will never be able to claim the
same representativeness as elections, referenda, or
even large-scale opinion surveys.
In that sense, policy science and analysis still face
the dilemma between serving either participatory
democracy and active citizenship, or an allegedly en-
lightened political and policy-making élite of the ad-
ministrative state. A dilemma which is as urgent as
ever, now that the political means for ‘making sense
together’ look very fragile in the face of the erosion of
public debate and the fragmentation, incommen-
surabilities, ruptures and confusions between value
systems and world views.
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Policy science and analysis still face
the dilemma between serving either
participatory democracy and active
citizenship, or an allegedly
enlightened political and
policy-making élite of the
administrative state
Future of policy analysis
Given the positivist beginnings and the post-positiv-
ist turn, what will the future of policy analysis look
like? I would place my bets on an argumentative turn,
the contours of which have been delineated already
(Fischer and Forester, 1993), within post-positivist
constraints. This would ban relativism, and simulta-
neously elaborate the usable elements of critical-ra-
tionalist, critical, forensic and participatory policy
analysis in a new tool kit for policy advice.
An argumentative turn in policy analysis method-
ology would affect the practice of policy advice sub-
stantially. Argumentative policy analysis entails a
looser coupling, sometimes even a decoupling, of
policy analysis from its traditional context of decision
support for government-initiated public policy
programmes. In argumentative policy analysis, it is
no longer government decisions, but public argument
and debate that claim centre stage. These two mecha-
nisms are either an established context gratefully
used, or, in cases of as yet under-developed public
fora, a context to be created by good forensic and
participatory analysis (Hoppe and Peterse, 1993;
1998). Like market inspectors who judge the fairness
of market conditions and issue measures to restore
them, argumentative policy analysts would some-
times claim the role of ‘inspector’ of the fairness of
the market-place for ideas, and assume demo-
cratic–pedagogical functions (Fischer and Forester,
1993, pages 6–7) — they would, literally, make
(small-d) democratic (capital-D) Deliberation
happen.
After bringing public debate to a timely but always
temporary closure, the argumentative analyst would,
of course, draw conclusions for issues where a genu-
ine consensus for further policy design and imple-
mentation has been created. Yet also when consensus
is still lacking, and even when dissent has sharpened,
the argumentative policy analyst does not stand
empty-handed. In the former case, she/he may advise
governments and other stakeholders on how to elabo-
rate jointly a strategy for partisan and serial adjust-
ments that increases the likelihood of greater
consensus at a later stage. In the latter case, he/she
may detect, in the chaos of discord and confusion,
those rare opportunities which may still exist for joint
inquiry and continued dialogue (Roe, 1994; van
Eeten, 1999), in the hope that opportunities for con-
sensus formation are kept open, and in the certainty
that continuation of dialogue in spite of discord is ra-
tional for sustaining the delicate fabric of the body
politic (Diesing, 1962).
In sum, argumentative policy analysis is, first,
epistemologically grounded in a fallibilist–dialogical
concept of scientific rationality, and a social–
constructivist perspective on social reality. Second, it
is based on a selection in context (Bobrow and
Dryzek, 1987) of the most usable parts of the
critical–rationalist, critical, forensic and participatory
traditions. Third, it does not advocate a sudden and
complete paradigm shift, but a patient and persistent
process of revamping and testing a new tool kit for
professional policy analysis. In this way, ‘speaking
truth to power’ may be transformed into an argumen-
tative policy analysis which re-invigorates political
prudence as ‘making sense together’.
Note
1. This is why, above, I argued that the new post-positivist
epistemological assumptions may be considered in place, but
the new institutional arrangements for developing and imple-
menting them in practice have not yet arrived.
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